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Abstract 
The use of colour in user interfaces is extensive. It is typically a usability issue, and has 
rarely caused any security concerns. In this article, we show that the use of colours in the 
design of CAPTCHA, a standard security technology that has found widespread 
applications in commercial websites, can have interesting but critical implications on 
both security and usability.  
1. Introduction
Colour is extensively used in user interfaces. In general it plays a major role in 
increasing the usability of many systems ranging from TV remote controls (whose 
buttons are highlighted in different colours to make them easy to spot) to complicated 
graphical user interfaces (where users’ navigation from one part to another is effectively 
guided by the use of different colours). When used properly, colour can much enhance 
user interface designs [7].  
The use of colour in interfaces is typically a usability issue, and has rarely had any 
security concerns.  
In this article, we examine the use of colour in CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated 
Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart) [1], now a standard security 
mechanism that has been widely deployed to address spam and other online abuse on the 
Internet. We focus on the most commonly used CAPTCHAs, which rely on 
sophisticated distortion of text images rendering them unrecognisable to the state of the 
art of pattern recognition algorithms but recognisable to human eyes. The popularity of 
such text-based CAPTCHAs is due to the fact that they have many advantages compared 
to other types of schemes [2], for example, being intuitive to users world-wide (the user 
task performed being just character recognition), having few localization issues, and 
having good potential to provide strong security (e.g. when properly designed, the space 
a brute force attack has to search can be huge). Some of our discussions are also relevant 
to other types of CAPTCHAs such as image-based schemes that typically require users 
to perform an image recognition task. 
A  good  CAPTCHA  must  be human friendly, and robust  to  resist  computer programs  
that  attackers  write  to  automatically pass CAPTCHA tests. To strike the right balance 
between usability and security for CAPTCHAs, many design issues other than the use of 
colour have to be addressed, but they were discussed in [13]. Solving accessibility issues 
2caused by CAPTCHAs, e.g. by exploring CAPTCHA alternatives [9], is also important 
and of practical relevance, but beyond the scope of this article, although some of our 
discussions will contribute to improve accessibility by identifying inappropriate use of 
colours in deployed CAPTCHAs.  
Colour has been commonly used in CAPTCHAs, mainly for the following reasons.  
! Colour is a strong attention-getting mechanism. 
! Colour can provide variation to fit different user preferences [8]. 
! Colour is appealing and can make CAPTCHA challenges interesting. 
! Colour can facilitate recognition, comprehension and positive affect. 
! Colour can make CAPTCHA images compatible with the colour of web pages 
and make them look less intrusive [3]. 
In some CAPTCHAs, colours were also used to provide some defence against automated 
attacks.  
In this article, we give a number of case studies showing that the use of colour is 
unhelpful for usability, has caused negative impact on security, or is problematic in 
terms of both usability and security. The case studies cover both colourful and 
monochromatic CAPTCHAs, and lead to valuable lessons for the design of robust and 
usable CAPTCHAs.   
2. Colour CAPTCHAs 
We first examine a number of colourful CAPTCHAs.  
Gimpy-r [1] was a well-known early CAPTCHA that used colourful challenges - four 
examples are shown on the left hand column in Figure 1(a). Designed at Carnegie 
Mellon University, this scheme was deployed by Yahoo! to protect their online services. 
In this scheme, the dominant colour of distorted texts in each challenge image always 
had the lowest intensity amongst all colours used, and this colour (often black) never 
appeared in the background. This made it easy to extract the challenge text by a 
computer program - the right hand column in Figure 1(a) shows the texts extracted by 
our automatic program that looks for black pixels alone.  
(a)  
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(b) 
Figure 1. Two early CAPTCHAs: (a) Gimpy-r, and (b) EZ-gimpy. (Original 
challenges are on the left hand column, and text extracted by our automatic 
program on the right hand column. Images in both columns provide just the 
same level of security)
The images in both columns in Figure 1(a) show what the challenges look like for 
humans and computers respectively, and they provide just about the same level of 
security. The colourful background was useless in terms of security – rather, its negative 
side effect is obvious: it confuses people and decreases the usability of the scheme.  
In general, breaking a CAPTCHA (in the sense of writing computer programs that 
automatically solve the test) involves a segmentation task, which is to locate individual 
characters in the right order, and a recognition task, which is to recognise which 
character is which.  
We had 100% success for segmentation, i.e. locating each character in the right order in 
the Gimpy-r images (Figure 1(a), the right column), using the method of Colour Filling 
Segmentation (CFS) [11], which works as follows. The basic idea is to detect every 
connected large component, which often corresponds to each individual character. Our 
algorithm first detects a black pixel in the image on the right hand side and then traces 
all its black neighbours until all the connecting black pixels are traversed - that is, a 
component is identified and segmented. Next, the algorithm locates a black pixel outside 
the area of the already identified component(s), and starts another traversal to identify 
the next component. This continues until all black components are identified. This 
method is effectively like using a distinct colour to flood each connected component. In 
the end, each black component is highlighted with a distinct colour, and the number of 
colours used is the number of black components in the image. 
After segmentation, it is trivial to apply standard techniques to recognise each individual 
character at a high speed. For example, a neural network achieved a success rate of about 
95% for recognising individual characters heavily distorted in different ways [4]. 
Therefore, we could break Gimpy-r with an overall success rate of ~81% 
("100%*.95^4). On the contrary, a common design goal for CAPTCHA security is not 
allowing a bot to achieve a success rate of higher than 0.01% [3]. Cleary, if breaking a 
CAPTCHA can be reduced to the problem of recognising individual characters in its 
challenge, then this CAPTCHA is effectively broken.  
The design flaw in Gimpy-r was also observed in EZ-gimpy (see Figure 1(b)), another 
well-known early CAPTCHA that was designed by the same CMU team and also 
deployed by Yahoo before.  
A similar mistake also occurred in CAPTCHAs that used gray-scale images, which have 
pixels of white, of black, and of many shades of gray in between. An example is a 
Securimage CAPTCHA (see the left hand column in Figure 2(a)) available at an open 
source CAPTCHA service http://www.phpcaptcha.org. By detecting all pixels of the 
foreground colour (white), we effectively extracted all challenge characters (see the right 
hand column in Figure 2(a)).  We then automatically detected with 100% success each 
individual character using the CFS method. As such, this scheme is effectively broken. 
On the other hand, in this case, gray scale images do not appear to cause much 
4degradation of usability.  
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Figure 2. Two Securimage CAPTCHAs: (a) the first scheme, and (b) the 
second scheme. (Original challenges are on the left hand column, and text 
extracted by our automatic program on the right hand column. Images in both 
columns provide just the same level of security) 
Another Securimage scheme (see Figure 2(b), the left-hand column) uses random arcs to 
intersect and connect its challenge characters with the aim of defending against 
segmentation attacks. This scheme uses three colours, one for the image background 
(white), one for the challenge text, and the third for the arcs. Since these colours are 
distinct, it is trivial to identify and remove the arc as follows. We first identify arc 
portions that are outside of the challenge text (i.e. those that are not intersecting with the 
text) and remove them by converting their colour to the background white. Then we 
convert the remaining arc portions to the colour of the text, and it is done (see Figure 
2(b), the right-hand column). Afterwards, the CFS method achieved 100% segmentation 
success. 
To make challenges look interesting, some CAPTCHAs generate images in which 
adjacent characters have distinct colours. The Cryptographp Captcha (available at 
http://www.captcha.fr/ and also available as a popular WordPress plug-in) is such a 
scheme, as shown in Figure 3(a). However, this design feature turns out to be a fatal 
mistake for security as explained as follows.  
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(d) 
Figure 3. Color misuse in Cryptographp and FreeCap CAPTCHAs. (a) Original 
Cryptographp challenges, (b) after background noise removal, (c) final segmented 
results; (d) two FreeCap examples. 
Random shapes such as circles and intersecting lines were used as noise in the original 
challenges. However, it is trivial to remove such noise since their thickness differs much 
from the thickness of characters in the images. Figure 3(b) shows the images after noise 
removal. Typically, it is difficult to segment characters that overlap with each other. The 
state-of-the-art suggests that a text CAPTCHA should rely on such segmentation–
resistant mechanisms to provide security [4]. However, since each character has a 
different (dominant) colour in this scheme, by picking up all pixels with the same colour, 
we effectively segmented overlapped characters, as shown in Figure 3(c). We tested this 
method on 50 random challenges generated by this Cryptograph scheme, and achieved 
100% success for segmentation. The average segmentation speed was about 60ms per 
challenge on a standard desktop computer. Any competent attacker therefore could 
bypass this scheme instantly. That is, the misuse of colour turned out to be a security 
disaster.  
A similar mistake was also observed in FreeCap (see Figure 3(d)), another popular 
CAPTCHA (available at http://www.puremango.co.uk/tag/captcha/). In this scheme, the 
feature that adjacent letters have different colours aids to segment touching and 
overlapping characters, which would be otherwise much harder to segment. It is 
worthwhile noting that the designer of FreeCap is security-savvy: his previous work 
identified a well-known attack, where simply re-using the session ID of a known 
challenge image could bypass some early CAPTCHAs [15]. 
BotBlock, available at http://chimetv.com/tools/botblock/, is an example showing that 
the misuse of fancy colours in a CAPTCHA can cause both usability and security 
problems. As showed in Figure 4(a), random letters are used in this scheme, and they 
appear in different places in a challenge. A sophisticated colour management method is 
introduced: backgrounds were of multiple colour blocks of random shapes, and 
foreground colours also occurred in the background.  
However, this fancy colour scheme often made it hard for people with normal vision to 
recognise challenge texts, and even harder for vision-impaired people such as those with 
colour-blindness. Colour blindness affects a significant number of people. For example, 
about 8% of adult males and 1% of adult females in North America and Europe suffer 
from colour blindness to some extend. The most common colour-blind people have 
difficulty with discriminating red and green [7]. 
Moreover, this scheme relied too much on the colour scheme for security – we tested 
100 samples of this scheme, and they were indeed all resistant to the best Optical 
Character Recognition program on the market.  
6Unfortunately, a design error made it trivial to remove all the fancy background: there is 
an exploitable colour pattern for foreground texts – the same colour occurs repetitively. 
By looking for that pattern, we successfully extracted the challenge text in all samples 
we tested. That is, the robustness of this scheme is just equivalent to that for the 
challenges showed in Figure 4(b), which are trivial to decode.  
     
      
      
(a)     (b) 
Figure 4. BotBlock CAPTCHA (a) sample challenges (b) challenge text 
extracted by our automatic program. (Images in (a) and (b) provide just the same 
level of security.) 
For example, the letters in Figure 4(b) were vulnerable to the “pixel count” attack we 
discovered in [10, 14]. That is, by counting the number of foreground pixels in each 
character, we could recognise most of the characters. For a few characters with identical 
pixel counts, a simple analysis of their geometrical shapes worked well to tell them 
apart. Such simple attacks have successfully broken all of the 100 random samples we 
tested. 
Figure 5. Colour misuse in two non-text CAPTCHAs (both taken from 
http://odiemiranda.com/2010/02/25/click-in-that-captcha/).
7All the above discussions are about text CAPTCHAs, but the misuse of colour has also 
occurred to non-text schemes. The first such example (shown in Figure 5) asks a user to 
click the red circle to pass the CAPTCHA. It is however trivial for a computer program 
to automatically identify the red pixels in the image to pass the test. The second example 
(in Figure 5) asks a user to work out a math problem and enter its answer to pass the test. 
However, since the answer is displayed in a colour that is distinct from all other colours 
in the image but always the same as the highlighted colour in the “TIP” line, it is trivial 
to extract the answer by identifying pixels of the appropriate colour. Afterwards, the 
security of this scheme is equivalent to the difficulty of segmenting the extracted digits, 
which turns out to be trivial.  
3.  Black and white CAPTCHAs 
In this section, we examine two text CAPTCHAs that used the colours of black and 
white. The first scheme was until very recently deployed by Megaupload.com, one of the 
largest file sharing and storage websites in the world. The second scheme is from 
BotDetect™, a commercial CAPTCHA system that claims a wide deployment by major 
websites (see http://captcha.biz/). We will show that even such a simple combination of 
colours could go wrong. Still, our attack primarily exploits the arrangement of colours in 
the CAPTCHAs. 
The Megaupload CAPTCHA is shown in Figure 6(a). A key innovation in this scheme 
was combining two mechanisms that were in early research [11, 5, 6] proven effective 
for segmentation resistance. The first mechanism is to make characters overlap and 
connect with each other, and this is good for security since in general current algorithms 
are not good at segmenting connected characters. The second mechanism is to make use 
of Gestalt psychology: although some portions of each character are removed, human 
are good at inferring the whole picture from only partial information, whereas machines 
are not. The idea was clever and easy to implement: each character (in the black colour) 
was connected with its neighbours, and the connecting areas were changed to the 
background colour (white) – the latter is effectively an XOR operation.   
   
    
   
 (a)      (b) 
Figure 6.  The Megaupload CAPTCHA. (a) Four example challenges with the 
8correct answers being NAQ6, VUX6, GMW7 and ZYB9, respectively. (b) The same 
challenges but with the Gestalt feature being turned off.  
The use of Gestalt psychology also contributes to this CAPTCHA’s usability: once you 
get used to the scheme, you can find it reasonably easy to read with a good accuracy 
which character is which. The usability improvement introduced by this Gestalt feature 
is apparent when we compare images in Figure 6(a) with those in Figure 6(b) – the latter 
are the same images but with the Gestalt feature being turned off.  
Our segmentation attack works as follows (see Figure 7).  
We first used the CFS method to extract black components, which define most of the 
actual content of each character and are never shared with adjacent characters. Figure 
8(b) shows the result of extracting all black components each being highlighted with a 
different colour. 
(a)       (b)   
(c) 
(d)
(e) 
Figure 7.  A segmentation attack on the Megaupload.com CAPTCHA.  (a) An 
original image; (b) Extracting black components (with small black noise removed); 
(c) Extracting all the white components except the main image background; (d) 
Extracting shared white components by removing loops; (e) Merging black and 
shared white components to form individual characters. 
The second step of our attack is to identify and extract shared white components, which 
are the connecting areas between adjacent characters. We first apply the CFS method to 
detect all white components. Then we exclude the main image background (i.e. the 
outside of the image text), which is the largest white component in terms of pixel count, 
and the remaining white components are shown in Figure 7(c). With some heuristics 
(details see [12]), we can also exclude, with a high success rate, loops that occur 
normally as part of a character’s shape such as those found in “A”, “Q” and “6”, and 
loops that occur as a result of connecting characters together, for example, the 
connection between “V” and “U” will lead to the creation of a loop (see example 2 in 
Figure 6(a)). Figure 7(d) shows all the shared white components were successfully 
identified. 
The final step is to put the shared white components in the right location to merge with 
corresponding black components to form each complete character. We know that n
9number of characters when connected horizontally should typically produce n-1
connection areas between them, and that shared white components that are juxtaposed 
vertically with each other must belong to the same connection area. Therefore in the 
example that has four characters only as shown in Figure 7, we have: 
! All shared white components inside the first connection area and all black 
components to its left will be merged to form the first character.  
! All shared white components inside the first and second connection areas and 
all black components between them will be merged to form the second 
character.
! All shared white components inside the second and third connection areas and 
all black components between them will be merged to form the third character. 
! All shared white components inside the third connection area and all black 
components to its right will be merged to form the fourth character.   
Finally, we convert the colour of merged components to black and space characters 
away from each other horizontally. Figure 7(e) shows the final segmented result. 
Our attack achieved a segmentation success rate of higher than 78%, and it took about 
120ms on average to segment each challenge on a standard desktop computer. This 
implies that we could break the Megaupload CAPTCHA with an overall (segmentation 
and then recognition) success rate of 63.7% ("78.25*95^4). Details of our attack, 
together with a failure analysis, can be found at [12]. 
The BotDetect™ CAPTCHA that we will examine is a Chess scheme as named by its 
designers. As shown in Figure 8(a), this scheme is effectively like embedding characters 
within a chess board. As each character is divided into a number of components, either 
black or white, and all the characters are mixed and connected with the chess board, the 
designers expect that it is hard for automated programs to extract and recognise the 
embedded characters. However, a simple attack works as follows. We first detect each 
chess box. If the majority of pixels in a box are black, we reverse all the pixels that are 
originally black to white, and the pixels that are originally white, if any, to black. If the 
majority of pixels in the box are white, we do nothing. Figure 8(b) shows that all the 
characters were successfully extracted by our automated program. It’s trivial to extract 
each character in Figure 8(b) using the CFS method, and therefore this scheme is broken.  
(a)      (b) 
Figure 8. A BotDetect™ CAPTCHA: (a) sample challenges (b) challenge text 
extracted by our automated program. 
4. Concluding remarks  
A main lesson we have learned is that the use of colour in CAPTCHAs can be tricky – it 
is more than a mere usability issue, but can have an impact on usability, security or both. 
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In the mean time, we observed that the recent versions of the following most widely-
used text CAPTCHAs do not use fancy colour schemes.  
! Microsoft: a simple colour scheme is used, where foreground (i.e. challenge 
text) is dark blue and background light gray.  
! Google: all texts use a single colour (green, red or blue), and a white 
background.  
! Yahoo: uses black and white only.   
! reCAPTCHA (http://recaptcha.net): uses black and white only. It is worthwhile 
mentioning that reCAPTCHA is the latest design from the same team that 
invented Gimpy-r and EZ-gimpy. 
This observation is in line with our following conclusion. The well-known “Las Vegas 
effect” on the use of colour in interface design suggests that using fewer colours can be 
better than using too many. This also applies to text CAPTCHAs, and in this context, it 
is not only a usability principle but also a security lesson.  
Therefore, we have the following tentative recommendations for CAPTCHA designers:  
! When you are not sure (for example, if you are not an expert in both human 
vision and image processing), use two colours in your scheme with one for 
background and the other for foreground, for the sake of both security and 
usability. The simplest safe choice can be just to use black/white. 
! Otherwise, using fancy colour schemes might introduce usability problems. For 
example, it is far more difficult than it appears to tell what kind of colour 
images would cause problems for colour-blind people, given the number of 
different types of colour-blindness. More importantly, an imprudent use of 
fancy colour schemes could fail to provide any resistance to attacks that aim to 
break your scheme. 
! It is not necessarily impossible to use colour to enhance both security and 
usability of a CAPTCHA. Rather, this is an interesting and worthwhile open 
problem.  
! For now, we recommend that a text CAPTCHA should rely on other better-
understood segmentation-resistant mechanisms [11] to provide security. 
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